what is the stratic importance of puerto rico to the usa

Puerto Rico in the Common cold State of war

During the height of the Cold State of war, Latin America became a strategic pillar of the hemispheric defence doctrine, serving a key to the ability struggle between East and Westward. Post-obit the Cuban Revolution and the overthrow of the Us-friendly regime of Fulgencio Batista, the United states became concerned with the spread of the Soviet Matrimony's influence in Latin America, becoming heavily invested in retaining as much influence as possible. With the nuclear arms race at its peak, a Soviet transfer of nuclear warheads to its Latin American ally in Cuba near ended in the onset of World War Three in October 1962. Afterward, the United States hardened its influence throughout Latin America, involving itself in what became known as the "Dirty War", a process that involved questionable actions including supporting or overthrowing governments depending on political leaning, supporting destructive groups such equally the Contras with weaponry and funding, or participating in controversial operations such as Operation Charly and Operation Condor. The fallout from these actions affect Latin America–United States relations to this day.

Having been annexed from Spain in 1898, the unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico represented a paradox during the Cold War, politically belonging to the United States but culturally to Latin America. Its location in the Caribbean converted information technology in the American response to Cuba, straight affecting the development of its political status. Puerto Rico was allowed to enact a heavily revised local Constitution, but its attempts to employ its sovereignty and employ it to remove the application of the Territorial Clause of the Usa Constitution ended in failure. The United States military played a key part in perpetuating the status quo, not wanting to take chances the possibility that a modify in status could affect their presence in the Caribbean. A situation farther complicated by the emergence of Marxist guerrillas, including the notorious Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña and Boricua Popular Army, within the pre-existing independence movement in Puerto Rico. Ultimately, the condition issue stagnated throughout the remainder of the Cold State of war, but the pro-sovereignty efforts undertaken during this time frame eventually led to the current incarnation of the free association motility in Puerto Rico.

Background [edit]

Marxist expansion in Latin America [edit]

Throughout much of Latin America, reactionary oligarchies ruled through their alliances with the military elite and United states. Although the nature of the U.S. function in the region was established many years earlier the Cold State of war, the Common cold War gave U.S. interventionism a new ideological tinge. But by the mid-20th century, much of the region passed through a college state of economic development, which bolstered the power and ranks of the lower classes. This left calls for social modify and political inclusion more than pronounced, thus posing a challenge to the strong U.S. influence over the region's economies.

In Cuba, the July 26 Movement seized power in Jan 1959, toppling President Fulgencio Batista, whose unpopular regime had been denied arms by the Eisenhower administration.^[1]

Diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States continued for some fourth dimension after Batista's autumn, simply President Eisenhower deliberately left the capital to avoid meeting Cuba's young revolutionary leader Fidel Castro during the latter'due south trip to Washington in April, leaving Vice President Richard Nixon to bear the meeting in his place.^[2] Cuba began negotiating arms purchases from the Eastern Bloc in March 1960.^[three]

In Jan 1961, just prior to leaving office, Eisenhower formally severed relations with the Cuban authorities. In April 1961, the administration of newly elected American President John F. Kennedy mounted an unsuccessful CIA-organized ship-borne invasion of the isle at Playa Girón and Playa Larga in Las Villas Province—a failure that publicly humiliated the United States.^[iv] Castro responded by publicly embracing Marxism–Leninism, and the Soviet Union pledged to provide further back up.^[iv]

By the 1960s, Marxists gained increasing influence throughout the regions, prompting fears in the United states that Latin American instability posed a threat to U.S. national security. Latin American revolutionaries shifted to guerrilla tactics, heavily influenced by the Cuban Revolution. Arbenz savage when his military had deserted him. Since then, some futurity Latin American social revolutionaries and Marxists, virtually notably Fidel Castro and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua made the army and governments parts of a unmarried unit of measurement and somewhen set up single party states. Overthrowing such regimes would require a state of war, rather than a unproblematic CIA performance, the landing of Marines, or a rough invasion scheme like the Bay of Pigs Invasion.

American interest [edit]

Throughout the Cold War years, the U.S. acted as a barrier to socialist revolutions and targeted populist and nationalist governments that were aided by the communists. The CIA overthrew other governments suspected of turning pro-communist, such as Guatemala in 1954 under Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. The CIA Operation PBSuccess eventually led to the 1954 coup that removed Arbenz from power. The operation drew on an initial plan first considered in 1951 to oust Arbenz named Operation PBFortune. Arbenz, who was supported by some local communists, was ousted shortly afterward he had redistributed 178,000 acres (720 km²) of United Fruit Company land in Guatemala. United Fruit had long monopolized the transportation and communications region there, along with the chief export commodities, and played a major role in Guatemalan politics. Arbenz was out shortly afterwards, and Republic of guatemala came under control of a repressive military regime.

A U.Southward. Navy P-ii of VP-18 flying over a Soviet freighter during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Continuing to seek ways to oust Castro following the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Kennedy and his administration experimented with various ways of covertly facilitating the overthrow of the Cuban government. Significant hopes were pinned on a covert program named the Cuban Project, devised under the Kennedy assistants in 1961.

In February 1962, Khrushchev learned of the American plans regarding Republic of cuba: a "Cuban project"—canonical by the CIA and stipulating the overthrow of the Cuban government in October, perchance involving the American armed forces—and yet one more Kennedy-ordered operation to assassinate Castro.^[5] Preparations to install Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba were undertaken in response.^[v]

Alarmed, Kennedy considered various reactions, and ultimately responded to the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba with a naval blockade and presented an ultimatum to the Soviets. Khrushchev backed downward from a confrontation, and the Soviet Union removed the missiles in return for an American pledge non to invade Republic of cuba again.^[6] Castro later admitted that "I would have agreed to the employ of nuclear weapons....we took it for granted that it would become a nuclear war anyway, and that nosotros were going to disappear."^[7]

The Cuban Missile Crisis (October–November 1962) brought the earth closer to nuclear war than ever before.^[8] It further demonstrated the concept of mutually assured destruction, that neither superpower was prepared to employ their nuclear weapons, fearing total global destruction via mutual retaliation.^[9] The backwash of the crisis led to the start efforts in the nuclear arms race at nuclear disarmament and improving relations,^[10] although the Cold State of war'due south first arms command agreement, the Antarctic Treaty, had come up into strength in 1961.^[11]

In 1964, Khrushchev's Kremlin colleagues managed to oust him, just allowed him a peaceful retirement.^[12] Accused of rudeness and incompetence, he was also credited with ruining Soviet agronomics and bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war.^[12] Khrushchev had become an international embarrassment when he authorized construction of the Berlin Wall, a public humiliation for Marxism–Leninism.^[12]

History [edit]

The PPD and the pursuit of sovereign association [edit]

The pursuit of sovereignty within the Popular Democratic Political party (PPD) can be traced to the moment of its foundation.^[13] The organization was originally created to support the independence of Puerto Rico, following the partitioning of the Liberal Party. Among the political party'southward early leaders were Muñoz and Antonio Fernós-Isern, both supporters of Puerto Rican independence.^[xiii] Inside the PPD, the concept of an Estado Libre Asociado (lit. "Associated Free State") was conceived past Fernós as an sovereign body associated to the United States past common consent.^[14] He first presented his thought of a sovereign association that preserved a common coin, citizenship and marketplace admission in a press article published in 1939.^[15] Fernós declared that Puerto Rico had a right to acquire its sovereignty and as such, could besides delegate part of it equally long as it was on equal juridical and moral terms.^[16] He proposed a model which allowed a proper nationality that was associated, just non subordinated to the other.^[16] The proposal intended to negotiate which rights and responsibilities each side would retain through an "bilateral organic pact".^[14] The idea took some inspiration from Aboriginal Greece, where deferent states would enter into confederations in order to cooperate in common interests.^[14] Like its Liberal Party predecessor, this proposal was also influenced past the British model.^[fourteen]

Fernós argued that the Republic realm relationship betwixt Canada and the Uk surpassed a simple course of autonomy, instead being a kind of clan superior to any status that would proceed the sovereignty of Puerto Rico in the hands of Congress.^[17] He considered his proposal a "free federated commonwealth" and a "republic lacking international relations", which would exist freely delegated to the Federal Regime of the Us.^[18] Among other observations, Fernós also noted how ridiculous information technology was to see the Usa Congress agree the sovereignty of Puerto Rico when information technology wasn't the sovereign of the United States or its people and merely served as a representative of the pop vote.^[17] He ultimately condemned the idea of a condition where sovereignty was forfeit in favor of autonomy, comparing such an arrangement to a monarchy.^[17] The following year, Fernós analyzed the complications of straight transitioning from the colonial economic model established past the United states of america and listed what he considered could exist possible steps for a prosperous sovereignty.^[sixteen] On July 21, 1940, the founding assembly for the new party was held with the collaboration of 2,000 delegates.^[nineteen] Fernós, who idea that the socio-economic bug should be attended kickoff, was largely responsible for drafting the respective part of the party's program, beingness joined by Vicente Géigel Polanco and Rafael Arjona Siaca.^[19]

Inspired by a painting by Ramón Frade named "El Pan Nuestro", he proposed the jíbaro every bit the party'south mascot and likewise coined the "Partido Popular" function of the name, which was completed in a reunion to earn its electric current name, Pop Autonomous Party.^[20] For the following years, Fernós played a key office inside the PPD, about notably in its legislation and finances.^[21] He reluctantly ran for the position of Resident Commissioner at the 1940 full general elections.^[21] In 1945, Muñoz led a local Commission that subsequently became involved in the procedure to create a third option that savage betwixt independence and statehood, the similarly divers "Dominion" status authored by Vicente Géigel Polanco.^[22] Despite these advances, Fernós continued elaborating his e'er-evolving model for a "third option".^[16] In 1946, Fernós noted that as part of the ongoing process, Congress had to openly express its willingness to renounce the sovereignty of Puerto Rico that it had acquired through the Treaty of Paris, thus assuasive the archipelago to create a proper cocky-government.^[23] Furthermore, he argued that the transfer of sovereignty that took place in 1898 should be invalidated.^[23] Despite the veto of appointed American governor Rexford Tugwell, the PPD'due south legislature canonical a two projects towards this goal, one supporting a status referendum and the other supporting the nomination of a Puerto Rican to the office of governor, but to receive the veto of president Harry Due south. Truman.^[24] In July 1946, Tugwell abased the office of governor.^[25] Piñero was then appointed every bit the new governor, the first Puerto Rican to practice so under American colonial rule.^[25]

The Estado Libre Asociado every bit conceived by Fernós was focused on the internationalization of Puerto Rico rather that its growth within the limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United States, equally exposed in an article published by him on July 2, 1946, where he discussed the blazon of relation that should exist established with the rest of the world.^[26] The most notable example is his argument that the economic system needed to evolve from the bilateral terms of the territorial clause to a multilateral model that immune for better trade options.^[27] Fernós also supported the conservation of the economical aspects of the Foraker Constabulary that would do good Puerto Rico over the countries that lacked a formal form of association.^[28] Amidst the perceived advantages was complimentary commerce and the partial devolution to the Puerto Rican Treasury of the earnings gathered from the sale of local products.^[29] The post-obit mean solar day these terms were supported by the PPD'southward leadership, establishing the party's ideological tendency every bit one of back up to a form of association that relied on reclaiming the national sovereignty of Puerto Rico.^[26] That same year, Fernós was elected Resident Commissioner for the PPD and began promoting that Puerto Rico reclaimed its sovereignty from the United states Congress, while also conserving an economic link between both.^[thirty] One time in Washington, he created friendships with several Congressmen and functionaries of the Usa Department of the Interior (DOI), which went on to become influential allies.^[31]

While in office, the appointment of Mariano Villaronga to the office of Commissioner of Instruction of Puerto Rico.^[18] This took identify while the pro-statehood factions argued that the public instruction should exist in English in order to facilitate a future admission.^{[nb 1] [32]} However, Villaronga supported the utilize of the established Spanish language. Understanding the implications that this had on the condition of Puerto Rico, Fernós sided with Villaronga, noting that conserving the Spanish linguistic communication played a key role in conserving the Puerto Rican cultural identity.^[33] His arrival also coincided with the proposal of Public Constabulary 362, which amended the Jones Law to let Puerto Ricans the right to elect their own governor.^[34] Fernós firmly supported these initiatives, assertive that it was instrumental towards establishing a sovereign constitution in the near future and played a key role in its approval, turning Puerto Rico into the commencement territory to democratically elect a governor.^[35] While remaining Muñoz'due south main contact in Washington, Fernós likewise developed an interest in the process that created an Organic Act for Guam, a long-standing military possession with parallels to his own example.^[36] He pushed status language that would later be used as precedent when attending Puerto Rico'south status.^[36] Between 1945 and 1950, Fernós modified his status proposal a total of 28 times.^[37] His efforts were supported by a parallel initiative undertaken past the DOI that tried to harmonize the public policy on territories with the anti-colonialism treaties that the U.s. reached with the United Nations.^[38]

Fernós coincided with most of what the DOI proposed, but refused the imposition of organic laws approved past Congress, believing that the political organization of the territories was an internal affair that must be based on the recognition of their respective sovereignties.^[38] In a 1947 draft titled "An act to establish the People of Puerto Rico as a self-governing community", Fernós included language that would exclude Puerto Rico from the Laws of Cabotage.^[39] On August five, 1947, the Butler-Crawford Elective Governor Law was approved, allowing Puerto Rico the pick to democratically elect a governor for the first fourth dimension since the U.s.a. invaded.^[twoscore] Muñoz Marín became the ane elected in representation of the PPD. Fernós argued that these changes were insufficient, citing that the Organic Act that allowed Congress to nullify local laws should exist abolished and that only the Federal Laws that benefited Puerto Rico should apply locally.^[41] He afterwards stated that these changes were just a return to the degree of cocky-government previously granted by the Carta Autonómica (lit. "Democratic Charter") approved past Spain in 1897.^[42] Additionally, he demanded the democratization of other institutions that remained under federal jurisdiction and that the command of aduanas was transferred to the Puerto Rican Treasury.^[41]

Fernós continued his pursuit of sovereignty by pursuing the cosmos of a local Constitution that was completely redacted, lacking "colonial vestiges" including unwanted Federal Laws, unmodified and presented by democratically elected representatives of the Puerto Rican people, with the back up of the popular vote.^[43] A local Constitution would likewise be a cornerstone of an acceptable form of association and so was the institution of local self-government via the autonomous election of a governor.^[44] However, these would but serve every bit steps towards the final goal of reclaiming the national sovereignty of Puerto Rico.^[40] The following year, he noted that the volition of most Puerto Ricans was to create a organisation that would erase all vestiges of colonialism.^[45] Fernós chosen his vision commonwealth soberano (lit. "sovereign commonwealth"), a midpoint status that he expected would "liquidate" the colonial regimen and perfect the economic relation between Puerto Rico and the United States.^[46] The Constitution drafted past the Puerto Ricans would be considered an "Organic Pact" that could simply exist modified via mutual consent.^[47] On August 15, 1948, the PPD officially adopted the system of a Constituent Assembly as function of its government program.^[48] Shortly afterwards, Fernós appeared in a radio broadcast explaining his proposal, claiming that full independence was not possible at the moment due to opposition in Congress and that statehood would be impossible for a prolonged time menstruation.^[49] He over again discussed the relation existing betwixt the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth realms and argued in favor of a similar relationship betwixt Puerto Rico and the The states.^[49]

Of item interest to Fernós was the elimination of the Cabotage laws.^[fifty] This coincided with the Truman administration's adoption of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, an initiative that pursued the cocky-determination for the territories that lacked cocky-regime.^[51] The 1948 general elections took on a plebiscitary approach and saw Muñoz Marín back up Fernós' proposal to pursue a relation similar to the Commonwealth realms, although, he noted that information technology should merely serve as a transition for independence or incorporation.^[23] Withal, taking inspiration on Thomas Jefferson's Northwest Ordinance, the political party's president likewise wished to launch a project containing disposition and manufactures in the nature of a "compact", "forever to remain unalterable unless past common interest", a language that he added to Fernós's proposal.^[52] During the concluding months of 1949, Fernós discussed the final version of his project with Muñoz and the following year, the document was reviewed by a PPD Commission.^[47] The project underwent one concluding revision before being formally presented to the United states of america Business firm of Representatives.^[47] Withal, during the subsequent procedure the draft bill was dissected and underwent a series of consummate revisions to the draft, which took place at the Mayflower hotel.^[53] There, Fernós took a cautious approach, focusing on the initial blessing of the bill.^[54]

After approaching the members of several Congressional committees and sub-committees, he presented H.R. 7674 on March 13, 1950.^[55] Subsequently another revision, the bill was unanimously approved in the U.s. Senate and received the opposition of Rep. Vito Marcantonio in the U.s.a. Firm.^[56] Marcantonio remained its most vocal opposition, arguing that in practise Congress was non really granting Puerto Rico the complete sovereignty required to beat out its colonial condition.^[57] On the other manus, Fernós felt that if Congress could return total sovereignty to the Philippines, they could grant the partial sovereignty that his original proposal pursued to Puerto Rico, which in turn would voluntarily delegate the residue.^[57] He conceded that in the heavily amended version, the majority of Puerto Rico's sovereignty would remain in Congress as established in the Treaty of Paris. Still, he still believed that the sovereignty gained by the Us through the Treaty of Paris was still limited, since he considered that they could not surpass the command retained by Espana with the establishment of the 1876 Constitution and the 1897 Charter of Autonomy.^[58]

Truman signed the bill on July 3, 1950, and information technology became Public Law 600, which was canonical in a plebiscite the post-obit year and officially adopted as the Constitution of Puerto Rico.^[56] The degree of sovereignty acquired by Puerto Rico -if any- became a hot topic amidst local politicians.^[59] The process had damaged Fernós'south proposal, with cornerstones such as a multilateral economy and exception from the Cabotage Laws being stripped past Congress.^[60] Muñoz considered that the constabulary turned the semi-autonomous authorities was now the co-holder of said sovereignty.^[61] On July three, 1951, the system of a Constituent Convention was made official and Fernós was selected equally its president.^[62] This process selected the two names for the political model that would be associated with the Constitution of Puerto Rico; in English language the generic term "Commonwealth", in Castilian, the term Estado Libre Asociado (lit. " Freely Associated State") was selected, under the premise that no literal translation for "Commonwealth" exists in that language.^[63] On July 3, 1952, Truman signed Public Law 447 establishing the Commonwealth, which was inaugurated by Muñoz Marín 22 days later.^[16]

Failed attempts to secure sovereignty under the territorial clause [edit]

Conscious that the model approved past Congress diverted from his original creation by stripping it of sovereignty, Fernós pursued a serial of amendments that would complete the "sovereign clan" that he conceived.^[64] Nevertheless, in the years leading to this evolution, Muñoz systematically moved away from the common ideology that had joined him with Fernós, eventually leading to a chism inside the PPD that led to the get out of Vicente Géigel Polanco and the creation of the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP).^[65] In June 1946, Muñoz published an commodity titled "Nuevos caminos hacia viejos objetivos", which redefined his concepts of "freedom" and "sovereignty", the later of which he defined equally "an marriage of forces that produce the real ability [required] to execute the people'south volition".^[66]

This position began to establish an early on dissimilarity betwixt him and Fernós, who believed that sovereignty was a key aspect of his project.^[67] However, both ideologies were able to survive in parallel for some fourth dimension.^[68] Post-obit the Jayuya Uprising, Muñoz's public postures hardened and took a turn towards conservativism.^[69] Yet, Fernós remained loyal to his liberal origins, likely beginning an ideological distancing, which was generally kept out of the public.^[seventy] The moves that followed were influenced by this breach, and were focused towards improving the level of sovereignty that Puerto Rico possessed. Despite considering it a transcendental achievement, Fernós was not satisfied with this version and had previously told Muñoz that, once canonical, information technology would "nigh immediately" crave "scrutiny to perfect information technology".^[47]

His first proposal to change Law 600 was completed even earlier the model was implemented on March 27, 1952.^[71] Fernós idealized a program that consisted of systematically improving the degree of sovereignty by presenting a serial of projects in Congress, referring to this work every bit the "pursuit of [the model'south] perfection".^[71] Fernós gained notoriety inside Congress, also establishing a series of friendships with highly-influential congressmen, to whom he explained his pursuit of a form of sovereign association as the culmination of the Commonwealth's model.^[72] In 1953, Muñoz sent a letter to Truman arguing that the Commonwealth now possessed a complete form of cocky-government and requested that the case of Puerto Rico was removed from the United Nations' United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories.^[73] A position supported by interim Secretary of Interior Vernon D. Northrop.^[73] Fernós, equally the project's creator, served every bit Alternating Delegate of the United States at the United nations's Non-Self-Governing Territories Commission while the situation was existence overseen.^[74] Following a prolonged debate, the United States managed to convince the United Nations to remove Puerto Rico from the commission'south telescopic with the argument that a new status -in association by mutual agreement [and] invested with political sovereignty – had been reached.^[74] Parallel to this, Fernós presented Joint Resolution 252 in the US Business firm of Representatives, as well known equally the "Corrective Project", it was the first stride to "perfect" his model.^[75] The nib intended to "fortify" the notion that Puerto Rico was no longer a territory or possession and directly focused in rewriting ambiguous sections of Public Police force 600.^[76] The DOI supported information technology and so did the Congressional commissions that reviewed information technology. However, Muñoz suddenly ordered that it was removed from consideration.

After this evolution, Fernós and Muñoz held a serial of conversations at Trujillo Alto, where their conflicting ideologies began to clash.^[76] These combined with strategic differences between both leaders, which simply served to hindrance the "perfection of the association" as originally conceived.^[77] Matters were further complicated past the growing involvement of Muñoz'due south legal aides, José Trias Monge and Abe Fortas, who began taking over the legal aspect of the ideological definition.^[77] Fernós was affected by these developments, just even so continued his pursuit to accomplish the full ramble evolution of Puerto Rico'due south status through its sovereignty.^[78] Between 1954 and 1960, Fernós and several other figures realized a series if studies that intended to create a new project that would allow the Democracy to achieve the development that he believed in.^[78] Yet, his involvement was ofttimes express to his visits to Puerto Rico.^[78] In 1956, the PPD vowed to retake the status debate in social club to "perfect" the Commonwealth.^[79] On March 23, 1959, H.R. 5926, colloquially known every bit the Fernós Project, was presented before the The states House of Representatives as requested.^[79] Afterwards a sister project was presented in the U.s.a. Senate past James E. Murray, the collective bills became known as the Fernós-Murray Project.^[lxxx] This initiative intended to replace the Federal Relation Statute of Public Police 600 with a serial of "clan manufactures" and requested Congress to get in clear that Puerto Rico was no longer a territory or possession of the The states.^[eighty] The Fernós-Murray Project also included the multilateral economic system, as stated in the original concept of the Estado Libre Asociado.^[threescore] Some other straggled proposal that it intended to revive was the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the Cabotage laws.

The Fernós-Murray Projection also presented the possibility that the Supreme Courtroom of Puerto Rico could entreatment directly to the Usa Supreme Courtroom.^[81] The bill was not well received, specially by the Federal military machine agencies and the Secretarial assistant of the Interior.^[82] The fence began in the The states Business firm of Representative's Committee of Interior and Insular Affairs led by US Rep. Wayne Aspinall.^[82] The United states of america Senate was intending to wait the US Firm'southward analysis, a development that favored Fernós' strategy due to his reputation there.^[83] However, later on the possibility of a pro-statehood plebiscite was considered, Muñoz decided to have a counterintuitive step and involved US Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson, leading to the Senate'southward activeness.^[83] By altering Fernós'south strategy, the process took a turn to the worst, when information technology conflicted with U.s. Sen. Henry One thousand. Jackson, the congressman direct in charge of the debate status inside the Senate.^[84] In the subsequent public hearings, Jackson went on to become the notable figure to notice that under the Democracy, Puerto Rico was still under the jurisdiction of the territorial clause, exposing the contradictions between this fact and the case that the U.s. had presented before the United Nations.^[84] Now aware of this position, Fernós reunited with Edward S. Corwin who offered a supporting stance.^[84] Furthermore, a PPD reunion led by Muñoz further shifted the party's position to a more conservative posture, which was included in a revised beak that was presented before Congress in September 1959.^[85] This new posture, which discarded independence every bit a potential evolution and introduced an ambiguous support for time to come statehood "once the economical level matched that of other states", was responsible for introducing the term "permanent matrimony" to the PPD's internal status argue and, equally a straight event, began alienating Fernós and his vision of a sovereign development.^[86]

This determination was sorely taken past several members of the PPD due to its sudden turn towards the right and the term "permanent union" was criticized, existence perceived as a synonym for "eventual statehood".^[86] Despite representing a significant conflict between the ideologies of his credo and Muñoz'south, Fernós reluctantly included this linguistic communication to the revised bill.^[86] Despite representing a dissimilarity to his own beliefs, he was involved in the procedure, spending hours on it.^[87] On the other hand, Muñoz'south own posture became even more than conservative, leading to an statement in favor of allowing the residents of the territories to vote for the President of the United States, an act that would require an amendment to the United States Constitution and as well served as an indirect recognition of the fact that Puerto Rico was still under the territorial clause.^[88] This led to an unintentional debate, where the tax exemptions of Puerto Rico, when compared to other territories, became a hot topic.^[89] Muñoz responded that once the economy immune it, Puerto Rico would contribute to the Federal Government like the incorporated jurisdictions.^[89] This statement, which would place the Commonwealth fifty-fifty closer to statehood, was opposed by Fernós who claimed that the economic relation betwixt both parts should exist alike to that of two countries, and as such, it unnecessary for ane to toll the regime expenses for the other.^[89] While the pecker stalled in Congress, a local referendum was proposed by Fernós with the intention of disabling the pro-statehood faction.^[90] The appointment of this plebiscite led to another conflict betwixt both leaders and one time once again, the position of Muñoz prevailed.^[91]

Meanwhile, Fernós continued to work on the bill, gathering what he considered a positive outlook.^[92] Nevertheless, Muñoz was bothered by a entrada launched by the pro-statehood Puerto Rican Republican Party criticizing it as "un-loyal, pro-independence [or] anti-american" and in a subsequent reunion suggested that the bill was completely ignored while that year's political campaign was underway.^[92] This represented however another ideological difference between both. Fernós drafted another version, merely this priority on revalidating proved to exist responsible for the failure of the Fernós-Murray Projection.^[93] On January xi, 1961, Muñoz requested that instead of continuing with this initiative, the Resident Commissioner was to present a different neb that eliminated the limitations on loan margins.^[94] Fernós was the concluding member involved in the status revision to be informed of this change in strategy, which had been idealized past Arturo Morales Carrión, a Puerto Rican that belonged to the Usa delegation in the Un.^[94] This new initiative moved the focus away from Congress, the holder of Puerto Rico'south sovereignty, to the executive power.^[95] The intention was to exploit the relation between Muñoz and the newly elected president John F. Kennedy, positioning Puerto Rico equally a link between the United States and Latin America.^[95]

This was a reactive measure taken but six days after Prime Minister of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev and President of Cuba Fidel Castro denounced that Puerto Rico remained a territory before the Full general Assembly of the United nations.^[96] Fernós was excluded of the procedure and shortly afterwards, Muñoz fabricated it clear that no further revision of the status of Puerto Rico were planned in the near future.^[97] Despite this, the Resident Commissioner did present H.J.R. 124, requesting the emptying of the loan margin since it was something previously included in the Fernós-Murray Project.^[98] The development of the status now fell on an executive order that would explain the Kennedy administration's position on the Commonwealth equivalent to a "memorandum of understanding" and which would move Puerto Rico'south instance away from the DOI.^[99] The status strategy would now focus on two proposals, the Executive Order & Memorandum and the breezy and secretive Presidential Committee.^[100] In a letter sent to Chester Bowles, Muñoz admitted that the idea backside this strategy was non to actually modify the status of Puerto Rico, but instead to disable the argument that Puerto Rico remained a colony, i that was "a weapon freely used by Communists, Fidelistas and enemies of the United States".^[101]

Muñoz, Fernós and the demand for sovereignty [edit]

However, this entrada did no go as expected, the Legal Adviser of the Section of State did not support the notion that the Republic could be an "inalterable pact" that could only be modified by common consent, recognizing the fact that Congress -as the holder of Puerto Rico's sovereignty- was capable of doing and so unilaterally.^[101] This evolution triggered a sharp turn in Muñoz's ideology and strategy, which would lead to efforts to ensure that the Commonwealth'south development was to be through its full sovereignty.^[102] This placed him in the same line of Fernós for the first time in years.^[102] The strategy of both leaders would now be focused on acquiring concrete changes, instead of pushing partial measures.^[103] On February 10, 1961, Fernós noted that the Commonwealth, as it stood, had an absence of democracy and shortly subsequently created some other plan in line with the Fernós-Murray Project.^[103] Despite all if the failed efforts, he notwithstanding believed that the Commonwealth should mirror the relation of Canada and the United Kingdom and this was the right time to launch a pro-sovereignty campaign.^[104] The new plan became known every bit the Aspinall Project and its primary key divergence to the Fernós-Murray Project was that in order to be implemented, the Senate was to renounce to all of the Republic's sovereignty, resulting in the momentary creation of a Republic of Puerto Rico, which would then negotiate with Congress directly.^[105] This concept, known then as the "culminated" or "perfected Estado Libre Asociado" was consistent with the definition of free association approved by the United Nations on December 14, 1960, through UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV).^[105] Withal, the inclusion of statehood every bit an option in the plebiscite contemplated in the project did not sit well with Fernós.^[106]

The failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion further complicated matters with the Us military, which was now focusing on reinforcing its presence in Puerto Rico.^[107] The United States Section of Defense became involved, requesting that even if Puerto Rico caused the sovereignty desired, the armed forces was to retain the adequacy of expropriating terrains that they considered strategic granted past the pre-existing eminent domain.^[107] Furthermore, in that location were plans to aggrandize the The states Navy's presence in the municipalities of Vieques and Culebra.^[107] Despite attempts by the Puerto Rican authorities to moderate this, the Navy's plan went ahead unaltered.^[108] The procedure to launch the informal Presidential Committee was underway and the first version drafted by a group led by Muñoz completely abandoned the "permanent union" proposed years before, now adopting a "permanent association based on Puerto Rico's sovereignty".^[109] On the other hand, the governor likewise tried to prevent that the case of Puerto Rico was once again discussed before the General Assembly of the United Nations.^[110] This attempt was led by Vicente Maura and Laura Meneses de Albízu in representation of Cuba.^[110] Muñoz felt that the Caribbean crisis could stagnate the project, simply however favored its presentation.^[110] The typhoon discussed officially introduced the acts of sovereignty transfer and subsequent clan as a simultaneous procedure.^[111]

In Jan 1962, Arturo Morales Carrión published an analysis arguing that the "free association" purported by Public Police 600 had to be re-examined due to having its origin in the obsolete laws of 1900 and 1917, also supporting the integration of Puerto Rico to the international community.^[112] In the following process, Muñoz would frequently employ the terms "sovereignty and clan" to explain the goal of the project, also making a differentiation between it and full independence.^[113] There was consensus surrounding the demand for sovereignty, however, Fernós felt that presenting all of their demands at in one case would present a high degree of complexity that could risk its approval in Congress, instead supporting a more curtailed arroyo.^[114] When the Puerto Rican and U.s. delegations met at the commission, this business was proven true.^[115] Despite the fact that efforts were washed to inform the Americans of the steps planned, when both sides met their lack of awareness regarding the condition of Puerto Rico was made credible.^[115] Before a 2nd set of reunions took place in Puerto Rico, Fernós authored an analysis that tried to educate their counterparts.^[116] He and José Trias Monge pushed a two-stage process which would offset acquire the sovereignty from Congress and would later employ information technology in a plebiscite, which would also include independence and statehood.^[117] After more changes were done to the language of the draft, the Puerto Rican delegation appeared ready to defend its initiative.^[118] The subsequent reunions led to a profound discussion, where the ambiguity of the territorial Commonwealth was noted by Harold R. Reis who was the American in charge of overseeing defense and economic relations.^[119]

The Puerto Rican delegation made it articulate that their intention was to gain the sovereignty of Puerto Rico and employ information technology to enter into an clan with the U.s., also expressing its intention to create its own exterior relations and join international organizations.^[119] Before the side by side reunion, several drafts were made and Muñoz presented them to presidential aides.^[120] After reading the drafts, Kennedy recognized that the Commonwealth "relationship [equally presented in 1952 was] not perfected" and likewise requested some revisions.^[120] During the 10th Anniversary of the Constitution, Muñoz complicated the PPD'due south strategy by involving the Puerto Rican legislature and a local plebiscite, a pace that frustrated Fernós.^[121] This sudden determination had more side furnishings in Congress, where several legislators began questioning both the activeness that enabled Public Constabulary 600 and a move towards association, which was chosen "sweetened independence" by opposers.^[122] Before long afterward, Muñoz took a sudden reactionary conclusion to qualm the claims of independence and reconsidered the term "permanent union" and the proposal supporting presidential vote, adding them the project despite the straight contradiction between these and any form of sovereign association.^[123] Fernós believed this to be a serious error.^[124] Muñoz further complicated the proposal in an effort to calm the opposing pro-statehood faction, now proposing 2 related referendums, the commencement asking for an endorsement of the revision of the Democracy and a second one after Congress evaluated the options.^[125]

Fernós was concerned that this would dilate the process, peculiarly since he thought that Congress was unlikely to offering a compromise in a process that would include the consideration of statehood.^[126] Muñoz then suggested that they went directly to a plesbicite that only considered independence, statehood and a generic "Commonwealth".^[127] On August 16, 1962, PdC No. 616 which adopted the governor's idea was presented in the Puerto Rico House of Representatives.^[127] Fernós criticized the fact that the bill lacked the elements of the evolution that they had proposed towards a sovereign clan; the referendum had been turned into a harbinger poll.^[128] This presented a notable contrast to what had been accorded with the Kennedy administration.^[128] After the project went to public hearings, Hiram Torres Rigual and Juan Manuel García Passalacqua presented Muñoz with an analysis of the deponent arguments which focused on the recognition of the sovereignty and the opposition to the presidential vote.^[129] Despite his disdain towards the fashion that the issue was beingness attended, Fernós attempted to harmonize the local and federal processes.^[130] This neb was somewhen removed and replaced with another.^[130] Parallel to this, the members of the informal Commission continued their research for a bill that adult the current status.^[131]

Complications caused by the Congress and Cold War [edit]

Notwithstanding, Reis' subsequent visit coincided with the Cuban Missile Crunch.^[131] With the sudden complexity of the Cold War, Puerto Rico's part in the defense plan of the United States military was emphasized.^[132] This would have an impact in the negotiations, with Reis noting his concern about the implications that it would comport for defence and public policy.^[132] He recommended that all of the ideas were gathered in a draft.^[132] The document was completed by Trías Monge and opened by stating "the United States of America hereby relinquishes its sovereign rights in and to Puerto Rico and the next islands and waters referred to in Article II of the Treaty of Peace signed at Paris on Dec ten, 1898, and proffers the following Articles of Compact as the basis of the association between the U.s.a. and Puerto Rico."^[133] No longer were the ambiguous term "permanent union" or the possibility of a presidential vote nowadays. A stage-bases procedure reminiscent of the i once proposed by Fernós was also suggested in a note.^[133] Notwithstanding, Muñoz had another plan and requested the creation of other drafts, which despite being in part authored by Fernós, now proposed that the initiatives were going to be presented in Congress earlier they were voted by the citizens of Puerto Rico.^[134] Before these were complete, the governor gave in to the demands of the Puerto Rico Republican Party and discarded using them, instead presenting his own typhoon which was further amended by the pro-statehood faction.^[135] This was considered a mayor victory for the integrationist party, who demanded and accomplished the re-inclusion of "permanent union" and the presidential vote, expecting that due to the consequent contradictions and the fact that Congress was unwilling to compromise before a popular vote the project would fail.^[136]

The product of this reunion was the one used in the final version of Joint Resolution No.1 of Dec 3, 1962.^[135] Enlightened that the amendments of pro-statehood group would nigh guarantee its failure in Congress, Fernós expressed inconformity about these changes.^[137] Muñoz reunited with all Puerto Rican members of the informal Commission and developed a strategy known every bit Operación ELA, which attended all sorts of concerns that had appeared among Congressmen, from several inmovilistic arguments to the farfetched the possibility of "a communist advance".^[135] The implantation of this initiative included a supportive presidential bulletin as well as several visits to members of Congress, journalists and fifty-fifty Nelson Rockefeller, all in an attempt to gain a positive outlook.^[138] In the 2d reunion of Operación ELA, Muñoz introduced a position newspaper that was not well received by Fernós, who once again reaffirmed that the goal was a "permanent association", since "permanent union" implied integration to the United States.^[138] The process was further dilated when the informal Commission suggested that the recommendations should be presented to the president earlier Congress.^[139] Muñoz consented, despite the protests of Trías, who argued that the Joint Resolution stated otherwise.^[139] As a consequence, some other Presidential Commission was to be created, the Status Committee, with but modest involvement from Congress.^[139] In a reunion with president Kennedy, Muñoz admitted that the presidential vote was non really of import to him.^[140] Aspinall joined Fernós in believing that the project was condign too circuitous and that would guarantee its failure in Congress.^[141]

In February 1963, members of Operación ELA held another reunion and the document that emerged from it applied the modifications proposed by the statehood motion simply retained Fernós' postures regarding sovereignty and association.^[142] The Resident Commissioner presented this typhoon to Aspinall, eventually reaching Reis, who presented a series of drafts.^[143] The 3rd of these reached Fernós and its liberal postures were consonant with his own, and he went on to analyze it and advise his ain changes.^[144] Following all-encompassing debate, the proposal was ultimately presented past Aspinall and received the lawmaking H.R. 5945.^[145] Nevertheless, the evaluation procedure of the preliminary proposals was rocky and earned the critics of key figures such as US Sen. Henry Chiliad. Jackson.^[144] At the urgency of United states Rep. Leo W. O'Brien, a member of the United States House Committee on Insular Affairs, who suggested it as a strategy to "facilitate" the blessing of the projection, Muñoz and Fernós had decided to temporarily put aside the demand of sovereignty.^[145] Both Aspinall and O'Brien claimed that the final revision would be clear to include this attribute.^[145] However, this did not happen. Fernós was forced to reluctantly accept a replacement -"inherent right and juridic chapters to enter into compacts"- in order to proceed the proposal alive.^[145] As was the case when confronted with previous strategic obstacles, Muñoz distanced himself from the demand of sovereignty.^[146] His apply of the term "permanent union" led to a confusion among Congressmen, who believed that only statehood could offer such selection.^[146]

However, this backfired when the PR Republican Party changed its posture and focused on attacking the Democracy and its possibilities of development.^[147] In representation of the Kennedy administration, Harold Seidman besides warned against the utilize of the term "permanent union".^[148] Despite receiving some bipartisan support, H.R. 5945 experienced a problematic course in the US Firm, stalling for five months.^[149] The deportment of Reis himself began indicating that he favored a change of strategy.^[144] Due to the failure of the circuitous version of the project, "brief" substitutive versions were presented, also officializing the inauguration of the Status Commission, a procedure led by the Resident Commissioner.^[150] Local politics saw the emergence of the reformist faction named Grupo de los 22 (lit. "The Group of the 22") inside the PPD.^[151] The grouping pursued the reorganization of the PPD'south construction and proposed several changes to the economic model.^[151] Despite its name, the group was large and included both liberals an conservatives. The faction was led past Juan Manuel Garcia Passalacqua, who since 1957 had been working on his own costless association model.^[151] Other member include Severo Colberg Ramirez, Victoria Muñoz Mendoza, José Arsenio Torres, Rafael Hernández Colón, Marco Rigau, Samuel Silva Gotay and Noel Colón Martinez. The Grupo de los 22 was assuming in its approach, first sending a letter of the alphabet to Muñoz asking him to abandon the candidature for governor and to assist bring along a change in generation.^[151]

While the faction clashed directly with the older members of the party, Muñoz was open to their proposals, including some in his last voice communication every bit governor titled El proposito de Puerto Rico (lit. "The purpose of Puerto Rico").^[151] Feeling that the status issue was not advancing, the grouping drafted a proposal pursuing complimentary association as divers in UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, which they intended to exist included in the party'due south platform for the 1964 General Elections.^[151] On April 13, 1964, the participation of a Puerto Rican delegation within the commission was made official.^[152] However, Fernós did not participate in the nomination of candidates nor participated equally an active member.^[152] Leaving a protect that promised to eliminate "all colonial vestiges", he decided not to pursue the re-election for the office of Resident Commissioner.^[152] Instead he opted to occupy an at-large seat in the Senate of Puerto Rico for the side by side four years.^[153] The project failed to provide any significant advances towards the resolution of the condition of Puerto Rico and during the post-obit years, the just notable action taken would be a non-binding referendum that did not produce any long-term reaction from Congress. On January nineteen, 1974, Fernós died disappointed at the fact that he could not meet the culmination of the sovereign clan that he in one case visualized.^[153]

Notes [edit]

1. ^ While the term "statehood" is ofttimes used when referring to a sovereign state, in Puerto Rico information technology refers to those that pursue the integration to the United states of america.

Footnotes [edit]

1. ^ Blumberg, Arnold (1995). Great Leaders, Groovy Tyrants?: Contemporary Views of World Rulers Who Made History. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. pp. 23–24. ISBN978-0-313-28751-0.
2. ^ Lechuga Hevia, Carlos (2001). Cuba and the Missile Crisis . Melbourne, Commonwealth of australia: Sea Press. p. 142. ISBN978-i-876175-34-4.
3. ^ Dominguez 1989, p. 22 harvnb fault: no target: CITEREFDominguez1989 (help)
4. ^ ^{a b} Smith, Joseph (1998). The Cold War 1945–1991. Oxford: Blackwell. p. 95. ISBN978-0-631-19138-4.
5. ^ ^{a b} Zubok, Vladislav M. (1994). "Unwrapping the Enigma: What Was Behind the Soviet Challenge in the 1960s?". In Diane B. Kunz (Ed.), The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Strange Relations During the 1960s. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 158–159. ISBN 978-0-231-08177-1.
6. ^ Jones, Howard (2009). Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1945. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. p. 122. ISBN978-0-7425-6454-i.
7. ^ James G. Blight (2002), Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Plummet, Rowman & Littlefield, p. 252.
8. ^ Gaddis 2005, p. 82 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGaddis2005 (assistance)
9. ^ Gaddis 2005, p. 80 harvnb mistake: no target: CITEREFGaddis2005 (help)
10. ^ Palmowski harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPalmowski (help)
11. ^ National Research Council Commission on Antarctic Policy and Science, p. 33
12. ^ ^{a b c} Gaddis 2005, pp. 119–120 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGaddis2005 (assist)
13. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. XVI.
14. ^ ^{a b c d} Ocasio 2009, p. Fifteen.
15. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. XXIV.
16. ^ ^{a b c d east} Ocasio 2009, p. 141.
17. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 93.
18. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 132.
19. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 146.
20. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 147.
21. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 148.
22. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 151.
23. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 142.
24. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 152.
25. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 157.
26. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 101.
27. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 108.
28. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 124.
29. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 154.
30. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 112.
31. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 158.
32. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 161.
33. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 163.
34. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 164.
35. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 165.
36. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 174.
37. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 184.
38. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 189.
39. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 190.
40. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 114.
41. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 116.
42. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 121.
43. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 125.
44. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 113.
45. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 194.
46. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 195.
47. ^ ^{a b c d} Ocasio 2009, p. 196.
48. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 134.
49. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 135.
50. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 136.
51. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 138.
52. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 156.
53. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 198.
54. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 199.
55. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 200.
56. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 201.
57. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 202.
58. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 207.
59. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 212.
60. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 111.
61. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 213.
62. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 230.
63. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 231.
64. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 20.
65. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 262.
66. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 264.
67. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 265.
68. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 266.
69. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 216.
70. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 217.
71. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. XXI.
72. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. XXIII.
73. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 268.
74. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 270.
75. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 272.
76. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 274.
77. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 277.
78. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 279.
79. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 280.
80. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 281.
81. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 312.
82. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 282.
83. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 283.
84. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 285.
85. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 286.
86. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 287.
87. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 288.
88. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 289.
89. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 290.
90. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 293.
91. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 300.
92. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 301.
93. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 303.
94. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 305.
95. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 307.
96. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 308.
97. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 310.
98. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 3111.
99. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 313.
100. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 314.
101. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 315.
102. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 317.
103. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 318.
104. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 319.
105. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 321.
106. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 322.
107. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 325.
108. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 329.
109. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 331.
110. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 332.
111. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 333.
112. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 336.
113. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 338.
114. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 339.
115. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 340.
116. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 341.
117. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 342.
118. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 344.
119. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 345.
120. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 347.
121. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 353.
122. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 356.
123. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 357.
124. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 358.
125. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 360.
126. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 36-.
127. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 361.
128. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 362.
129. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 363.
130. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 367.
131. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 368.
132. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 369.
133. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 370.
134. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 372.
135. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 373.
136. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 375.
137. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 379.
138. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 381.
139. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 384.
140. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 386.
141. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 387.
142. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 392.
143. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 394.
144. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 399.
145. ^ ^{a b c d} Ocasio 2009, p. 401.
146. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 408.
147. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 409.
148. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 410.
149. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 407.
150. ^ Ocasio 2009, p. 400.
151. ^ ^{a b c d e f} Ángel Collado Schwarz & Marco Rigau (December 22, 2013). "El Grupo de los 22" (in Spanish). La Voz del Centro. Retrieved February 18, 2014.
152. ^ ^{a b c} Ocasio 2009, p. 428.
153. ^ ^{a b} Ocasio 2009, p. 429.

Bibliography [edit]

• Roberto Colón Ocasio (2009). Antonio Fernós – Soberanista, Luis Muñoz Marín – Autonomista: Divergencias ideológicas y su efecto en el desarrollo del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico (in Spanish). Ediciones Puerto. p. 138. ISBN978-1934461662.

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty_of_Puerto_Rico_during_the_Cold_War

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